Talking about the mortgage settlement and Basel Accords

…with Chuck Coppoloa on First Business TV.

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Following Blind Ideology Right Off Cliff

…is the title of my op-ed in today’s Hartford Courant on the role that ideology played in walking us right up to the fiscal cliff.  Read it here!

The role of ideology in poor economic policy decisions is the theme of my new book, forthcoming later this year from Oxford University Press.  Stay tuned for more!

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Wanted: Central Banker

A couple of weeks ago, the Economist magazine ran an unusual “help wanted” ad.  The Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, will retire in June and the British government is looking for a replacement.

On the one hand, it might seem like a great job.  The Governor receives a salary of £300,000, or about $480,000, per year.  Also, at 318 years of age, the Bank of England is steeped in tradition. On ceremonial occasions, the Bank’s guards wear pink morning coats with tails, red vests, and top hats.

On the other hand, the Governor’s every move will be scrutinized and nobody will ever say anything nice about his or her job performance.

Central bank governors wield enormous power, setting the course of monetary policy and, increasingly, taking the lead in banking regulation.  Many consider the Governor of the Bank of England to be the second most important person in the country (after the prime minister), much as many in the U.S. consider the chairman of the Federal Reserve to be the second most important job in the United States.

The fact that the British government is advertising for someone to lead the Bank of England speaks volumes about how the job of central banker has changed in recent years.

Before World War II, most central banks were private institutions.  Even though they were responsible for policy decisions that had important implications for government policy, central banks were often independent of the government.  A running joke at Britain’s Treasury before World War I was that when its top civil servant visited the Bank of England, he took a taxi, because he was not quite sure where the Bank was.

Although central bankers did not operate in complete secrecy, they nonetheless worked primarily behind the scenes.  This characteristic was personified by one of Sir Mervyn’s predecessors, Montagu Norman, who was governor of the Bank of England from 1920 to 1944—longer than anyone else in the Bank’s history.  Although Norman did make public appearances, he was something of a recluse, frequently traveling under assumed names and going to great lengths to avoid encounters with the press.

Today, central bankers are no longer anonymous.  Their every movement makes news.  Financial reporters used to guess the course of Fed policy based on the size of the briefcase Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan carried into meetings at which monetary policy was decided.  When Greenspan fainted on the evening of June 26, 1989 (the 63-year old had played tennis that afternoon in the intense Washington, D.C. heat), rumors that he had had a heart attack caused a brief panic on Japanese financial markets.

And every remark they make becomes fodder for speculators and the press.  Greenspan was famous for his Sphinx-like utterances during his testimony before Congress.  Dubbed “Fed-speak,” Greenspan’s discourses were deliberately opaque so that he would not make news, which might send shock waves through financial markets.   Nonetheless, his speeches, like those of his successor Ben Bernanke, are studied the way a fortuneteller might read tea leaves.

Modern central bank governors are less inclined to hide than Montagu Norman.  Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, regularly holds news conferences to explain ECB policy. In the U.S., Bernanke holds quarterly press conferences.  Pragmatics, as well as democracy, favor this approach.  Instead of having the press, public, and markets spend fruitless hours trying to guess what the central bank will do or interpret vague pronouncements, central banks now declare their intentions at the outset.  This gives more force to their intended policy actions and makes it less likely that their actions will be misunderstood

The higher public profile of central bankers comes at a cost, however.  They are now firmly in the limelight—and the cross hairs of politicians—whether they like it or not.

During his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, Texas Governor Rick Perry said that any additional monetary easing on the part of Bernanke and the Federal Reserve would be “treasonous.”  The eventual Republican nominee, Governor Mitt Romney, has been only slightly kinder, making it clear that he would not reappoint Bernanke when the Fed Chairman’s term expires in 2014, without calling him a traitor.

The job of central bankers during the past few years has not been easy.  They have to guide monetary and regulatory policies during a period of fragile financial institutions and markets, weak labor markets, and sub-par economic growth.  And they have to do this in the glare of an increasingly partisan political environment.  Maybe it is not such a great job after all.

Of course, if you have not already applied for the Bank of England job, don’t bother.    Applications–submitted on-line, of course–closed on October 8.

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Libor needs to be scrapped—not reformed

Last Friday, a top British top financial regulator issued a report suggesting numerous reforms to the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor).  Libor, a benchmark interest rate that affects more than $300 trillion in financial transactions, is constructed from the cost of funds estimates submitted by a handful of large banks.  This summer, e-mails surfaced showing that a number of these submissions were manipulated to benefit submitting banks and their clients.

If Libor were to be reformed, the proposals outlined on Friday would constitute a good first step.  The problem is that Libor shouldn’t be reformed; it should be abolished and replaced with a market-determined indicator.

The report issued by Martin Wheatley, managing director of Britain’s Financial Services Authority calls for the administration of Libor to be taken away from the British Bankers’ Association and assigned to independent, well-regulated authority.  Banks that falsify their submissions would be subject to criminal penalties.

The report also calls for the reduction in the number of Libor rates issued, from the current 150 different currency-maturity combinations (e.g., one week euro, six month dollars) to 20 or so of the most commonly used.  It also recommends an increase in the number of banks submitting bids, so that Libor is calculated by averaging the submissions of larger sample of banks.

Finally, the Wheatley report recommends a number of technical fixes, including basing the submissions on transactions data and delaying the release of individual Libor submissions until three months after the fact, rather than publishing them daily.

Certainly, if Libor is to be maintained, as the Wheatley report recommends, these would be useful reforms.   They strengthen governance, improve the quality of Libor, and make fraud less likely.  The suggested reforms have already received favorable comments from regulators in the United States, Europe, and Japan.

The problem is that Libor is not fixable.

Although better administration and criminal penalties for fraudulent submissions could deter the type of fraud we have seen, given the huge amount of money riding on Libor, the incentive to cheat will still be overwhelming.  And since Libor submissions are estimates, it will be hard to prove that a high or a low submission was fraudulent.  The recent fines that were doled out over Libor submission were only possible because the perpetrators were stupid enough to describe their actions in e-mails.

Reducing the number of currency-maturity combinations is also sensible.  After all, a relatively small portion of the $300 trillion in financial transactions consists of Danish kroner loaned for two weeks or New Zealand dollars for six months.  So eliminating the minor currencies from Libor makes sense.  There are a number of market-determined alternatives for the major currencies—why not use them?

Neither delaying the release of individual submissions nor requiring banks to submit large volumes of transactions data will fundamentally fix the process.  Even if banks no longer manipulate their submissions at the request of fellow bankers or clients, they may be tempted to do so to appease the regulators.

It has been alleged that during the subprime crisis some banks lowered their submissions at the behest of regulators, who wanted banks’ cost of funds to appear lower than it really was in order to increase confidence in the financial system during a turbulent time.  Going forward, banks may try to generate submissions that are in line with other banks in order to avoid seeming “out of step” with other banks and drawing increased scrutiny from the regulators.

The only way to fix Libor is to scrap it and replace it with a market-determined indicator.  The new indicator could be the GCF Repo index published by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp, or some newly constructed index based on default swaps transactions, corporate bonds, and commercial paper, as suggested by Bloomberg.  This is the only way to insure that the rate will be appropriate and fairly determined.

Recent financial crises and scandals have weakened public confidence in the financial system.  Propping up a flawed financial benchmark will erode that confidence even further.

 

 

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The Wheatley report on Libor

See my reaction to the Wheatley Report at Law360.com.

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The GOP and GOLD

See my op-ed in the Los Angeles Times on the GOP platform’s call for further study of the gold standard.

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Consumers and the Future of Libor

Follow this link for an interview with Greg Field at NerdWallet.com.

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The biggest threat to capitalism

Most of us spend more time thinking about the latest London Olympics results than the scandal surrounding the London InterBank Offered Rate, or Libor. That is a big mistake.

We should be paying more attention to the Libor scandal.  And we should be terrified.

The public has been so fatigued by the flood of awful financial news during the past few years, that a scandal surrounding an interest rate that most of us have never heard of doesn’t seem like that big a deal. But in fact, the Libor scandal is potentially a bigger threat to capitalism than the subprime meltdown, the eurozone crisis, the Madoff scandal, and the MF Global bankruptcy.

Although these misfortunes are costly, they pale in comparison to the threat posed by the Libor scandal. The subprime crisis can be blamed on bad policies: irresponsible fiscal policy combined with loose monetary policy and poor regulatory enforcement. Similarly, the euro crisis can be blamed on one poorly conceived policy: creating one currency when retaining 17 distinct currencies would have been more workable. And the Madoff and MF Global debacles can be chalked up to a few unscrupulous and reckless individuals.

By contrast, the Libor scandal is nothing less than a conspiracy in which a few shadowy bankers conspired against the majority of participants in the financial system—that is, you and me.  Worse yet, evidence is now trickling in that regulators on both sides of the Atlantic may have had more than an inkling that something was fishy with Libor.

Suspicions of financial conspiracy are about as common as theories on the Kennedy assassination and the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby. Usually these are unsubstantiated.  This time, however, e-mails have surfaced demonstrating conclusively the extent of the conspiracy.  In one such e-mail, a grateful trader at Barclays bank thanked a colleague who altered his Libor submission at the trader’s behest: “Dude.  I owe you big time!  Come over one day after work and I’m opening a bottle of [champagne].”

Why is the Libor scandal such a threat to the financial system?

Interest rates on some $800 trillion in financial transactions are tied to Libor, including everything from complex derivatives to far more commonplace mortgages, home equity lines of credit, and credit card balances.  The number of ordinary consumer affected by Libor is enormous and the potential for litigation emanating from the scandal is enormous.

But the problems do not end there.

The key role of the financial system is to channel the accumulated savings of society to projects where they can do the most economic good—a process known as intermediation. My retirement savings may help finance the construction of a new factory; yours might help someone pay for a new house. Although Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein exaggerated when he called this function “Doing God’s work,” intermediation is nonetheless a vital function.

However, intermediation will come to a stop if individuals, corporations, and governments no longer trust the financial system with their savings. If people believe that the interest rates they pay and receive are the result of a game that is “fixed,” they will opt out.

They may not go so far as to stash their savings under their mattresses, but they will certainly keep it away from the likes of bankers they believe have been cheating them.  Instead they will hold it in cash or in government bonds which will reduce the amount of money available for productive purposes.  And that is the end of capitalism as we know it.

Despite our recent ups and downs, most people still put their faith—rightly, in my view–in capitalism, believing that it is more likely to deliver a high standard of living than any other economic system that the world has ever known.  Politicians need to be aware that this faith has its limits.

If our leaders do nothing to restore confidence in the market economy, the consequences will be far worse than anything we have experienced in the last few years.

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Musings on Libor

Here are a couple of recent musings on Libor.

Bankers Should Take A Lesson From The Mob,” was slated to appear in today’s Hartford Courant.

5 Questions With . . . Richard Grossman on the Libor Scandal,” an interview with Lauren Rubenstein, appeared in the Wesleyan Connection a few days before.

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A Blatant Misuse of History

Writing nearly 40 years ago, historian Ernest R. May warned of the dangers of misusing history for policy purposes.  May was primarily concerned that policy makers drew the wrong lessons from the past.

In their opinion piece in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, Glenn Hubbard, dean of Columbia Business School and an advisor to Mitt Romney, and Phil Gramm, a former US senator (R-TX) misuse history in another way: they misrepresent facts to support a partisan policy agenda

Hubbard and Gramm contrast the robust “Reagan Recovery” after the recession of the early 1980s with the tepid “Obama Recovery” following the current recession.  They argue that a “Romney Recovery” would look very much like a Reagan recovery.

Hubbard and Gram’s argument is simple.  The 1981-82 recession and subsequent savings and loan crisis resulted from the tight monetary policy conducted by then-Federal Reserve chairman (and Democratic-leaning) Paul Volcker.  The subprime crisis occurred because the government (read: Democrats) intervened in the mortgage market, easing mortgage lending rules.

The 1981-82 recession was caused by tight monetary policy, however, the savings and loan crisis–which erupted nearly a decade later–was due in large measure to the policy of financial deregulation pushed through during the Administration of the very Republican Ronald Reagan.

And blaming the recent recession on easing subprime lending rules while ignoring the ruinous consequences of Republican George W. Bush’s tax cuts (combined with increased defense spending) and Republican Alan Greenspan’s excessively loose monetary policy isn’t so much a misuse of history as a willful ignorance of it.

The argument that Reagan’s fiscal policy set the economy up for robust growth is laughable.  The economy picked up during the mid-1980s because Reagan ran huge deficits by cutting taxes and increasing spending.  Any other interpretation is a misuse of history.

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